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Questions Mount Over Nvidia Security Oversight Following CEO Resignation

Vivek Bagchi

November 15, 2026 • 07:40 AM

Questions Mount Over Nvidia Security Oversight Following CEO Resignation
Image Credit / Source: techcrunch.com

Questions are growing regarding the role and visibility of Nvidia's internal security team following the departure of former chief executive officer Jensen Huang. Huang stepped down two and a half months after the quiet exit of Nvidia's longtime chief security officer, amidst scrutiny over personal relationships and an ongoing federal inquiry into a Singapore-based data center firm.

David Reber, who served as chief security officer and head of product security for four years—and spent seven years total at Nvidia—stepped down in late August. At the time, Reber announced on LinkedIn that his departure was due to health reasons, sharing that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson's disease more than two years prior.

Reber was succeeded by Saša Zdjelar, a former senior IT manager who spent 17 years at ExxonMobil, one year at Salesforce, and several years at the cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. Zdjelar did not respond to inquiries on Thursday regarding the transition or what the internal security team was aware of prior to the executive leadership changes.

Extramarital Relationships and Federal Scrutiny

Huang's resignation followed growing scrutiny surrounding his extramarital relationships. The revelations began with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that United States investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia semiconductor chips to China. Megaspeed has denied any wrongdoing.

The inquiry subsequently expanded following reports of Huang's personal relationships with Nvidia employees. The New York Times reported, citing five employees, that Huang was involved with a vice president who reported directly to him. Reuters later reported a second relationship with an employee. While Nvidia's code of conduct does not expressly forbid such relationships, relationships with direct subordinates typically fall under the purview of human resources, legal teams, and the board of directors rather than physical or cybersecurity units.

However, security experts note that personal relationships involving executives associated with entities under federal investigation present distinct corporate risk profiles, as foreign intelligence services frequently attempt to exploit such vulnerabilities.

Corporate Security Limits and Intelligence Tactics

Former senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades, author of the 2020 book Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics, noted that identifying these vulnerabilities is challenging for corporate security teams. Eftimiades, who has trained over 1,000 corporate security professionals, explained that intelligence services primarily gather information through routine, everyday conversations rather than cyber hacking.

Eftimiades highlighted that corporate security departments often operate under limited budgets because they function as cost centers rather than revenue drivers. He stated it is common for chief executives to restrict security funding to minimum compliance levels.

In an opinion piece published in The Hill, Don Aviv, CEO of corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz wrote that many corporate entities define security too narrowly by focusing primarily on facility protection, physical threats, and cyberattacks. They argued that corporate security programs must increase focus on insider threats, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest, and attempts by foreign entities to cultivate personal contacts to access sensitive details.

Ongoing Inquiries and Systemic Vulnerabilities

Some divisions within Nvidia were aware of elements of the situation prior to Huang's departure. Nvidia's top legal counsel was engaged with the federal Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago. Nvidia stated that it routinely communicates with government officials.

Eftimiades noted that foreign intelligence operations often target policy insights and internal decision-making rather than technical data alone, seeking to identify key corporate decision-makers and friction points. He stated that long-term relationship cultivation remains a standard playbook for foreign services, particularly those associated with China.

Regarding technical capabilities, Eftimiades mentioned tools such as IMSI catchers—suitcase-sized devices costing around $1,000 in basic forms—which mimic cell towers to intercept mobile communications. It remains unknown whether such devices were targeted at Huang, whose phone was presumably hardened against compromises.

The extent of what Nvidia's security team knew and whether actionable steps could have been taken remain subject to ongoing clarification as the Nvidia board's independent investigation and federal inquiries proceed.

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